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ABSTRACT 
Pre – trial freedom is indispensable to individual citizens of the world. Nigeria has guaranteed the freedom to 
liberty as enshrined under section 35 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Lagos State of 
Nigeria in 1994 enacted the Criminal Procedure Law and in the case of Lufadeju vs. Johnson, section 236 (3) of 
the law which seeks to give powers to the magistrate courts in that State to order for the remand of suspects and 
or accused persons to prison custody pending when the police would complete their investigations or proper 
arraignment, came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court of Nigeria and the said law was validated by 
the court. This paper examines the said decision within the context of whether it has withered the 
unconstitutionality of holding charges in Nigeria’s criminal justice system and the policy implication of the said 
decision and concludes that  the far reaching pronouncements made by the court are capable of affecting the long 
aged established rule of the unconstitutionality of holding charges in Nigeria thence perpetuating the 
incarceration  of accused persons in prison custody even  where the police are not willing to prosecute which is 
against the spirit and letters of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
In Nigeria, the powers of the police to detain suspects are restricted by law to specific number of days. The 
highest is two days where there is no court within a radius of forty kilometers. They are therefore required within 
the period to bring a suspect before a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of trial. But in practice, the 
police before completion of investigations and even afterwards, arraign suspects before the Magistrate Courts in 
respect of offences for which the Magistrate Court has no jurisdiction to entertain merely for the court to take 
cognizance of the offence/s and obtain an order for remand in prison custody which is in other words referred to 
as holding charges and for which the courts in Nigeria have declared to be unconstitutional. However, Lagos 
State of Nigeria have appeared to have found a way out in ensuring that suspects are remanded in prison custody 
even before the completion of police investigations via an order of court with the promulgation of 236(3) of the 
Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State 1994 which was validated by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case 
of LUFADEJU VS JOHNSON (2007) 8 NWLR (PT 1037) P. 535.    
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Lagos state of Nigeria in 1994 enacted the Criminal Procedure Law1 and in the case of Lufadeju vs. Johnson2, 
section 236 (3) of the law came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court of Nigeria. In determining the 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Nigeria considered the following relevant provisions viz sections 78(b), 215 and 
236(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State 1994 and section 32(1) (c) of the 1979 Constitution3 and 
made far reaching pronouncements capable of affecting the long aged established rule of the unconstitutionality 
of holding charges in Nigeria more especially that some States High Court judges are readily taken advantage of 
the said decision in applying same to validate holding charges by Magistrate Courts in Nigeria thence 
perpetuating the incarceration  of accused persons in prison custody even  where the police are not willing to 
prosecute which is against the spirit and letters of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
Being the decision of the highest court of the land, the decision still subsists until set aside by the same Supreme 
Court that delivered the said decision.  
                                                 
1
 Cap 33, Vol. 2 Laws of Lagos State 1994. 
2
 (2007) 8 NWLR (PT. 1037) P. 535. 
3
 The equivalence of the said section is section 35(1) (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
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1.3 OBJECTIVE 
This paper therefore seeks to look at the implications of the Supreme Court of Nigeria decision in Lufadeju vs. 
Johnson on the Constitutional Right to Liberty of citizens, distinguish same from its applicability to some parts 
of the states in Nigerian aside from Lagos or other states that have no similar provisions to section 236 (3) of the 
Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State 1994 and to generally analyze whether the said decision has withered the 
constitutionality of holding charges in Nigeria’s criminal justice system. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology employed in the writing of this article is the doctrinal research method for the 
purposes of identification and analysis. The primary data are obtained through the adoption of doctrinal 
methodology. Doctrinal research method is to a large extent library oriented with reliance fully placed on 
relevant literatures. Reliance was equally placed on primary sources of data which involved a consideration of 
various types of domestic legislation in the area of Constitutional Right to Liberty as well as case laws and 
judicial decisions. Finally, originality is exhibited in making analysis and recommendations.  
 
2. FACTS OF THE CASE 
Evangelist Bayo Johnson (the Respondent) was arrested on the 12th of January 1997 for conspiracy to commit 
treason and the commission of treasonable felony. He was taken along with eleven (11) others before Mrs. E. A. 
Lufadeju, a Chief Magistrate Grade 1 on the 12th of March 1997 in Lagos. The charges were read but the pleas of 
the accused persons were not taken. An oral application for bail was made on the same day. Mrs. E.A. Lufadeju 
(1st Appellant) refused the application on the ground that she lacked the powers to entertain and consider a bail 
application in respect of a capital offence such as treason. The Respondent and others were remanded in custody 
at the Force C.I.D Alagbon, Lagos. The plea of Evangelist Bayo Johnson was not taken although the charges 
were read to him. As a result of the refusal of bail and the remand in prison custody of the Respondent, the 
Respondent (Evangelist Bayo Johnson) filed as action at the High Court by way of an application under the 
Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. He asked for a declaration that his detention prompted by 
the magistrates order was unconstitutional and urged the court to quash the order. He also claimed N5, 
000:000:00 (Five Million Naira Only) as damages for his illegal detention. The High Court dismissed the 
application. It declared that the magistrate order of 12th March 1997 was a valid order and that the proceedings of 
that day was a remand proceedings under section 236 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State. 
Evangelist Bayo Johnson was dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court and he appealed to the 
Court of Appeal which allowed the appeal. It held that Section 236 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Law conflicts 
with the constitution. Both the orders of the magistrate and that of the High Court were set aside. Mrs. E.A 
Lufadeju and her co- appellants were dissatisfied with the judgment and they appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria. The argument of the Appellants in the main was that the proceedings before the Magistrate were remand 
proceedings and not arraignment. The Respondent countered that the proceedings were arraignment and not 
remand proceedings.  
The Supreme Court of Nigeria considered Sections 78 (b), 215, 118 (11) and 236 (3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Law of Lagos State 1994, Sections 32 (1) (c), 33 (4), 33 (5) and 6 of the 1979 Constitution, section 35 
of the Criminal Code1, section 215 Criminal Procedure Law2, Articles 7(I) (b) and (d) of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Right 1979 as well as Order 1 Rule 2 (b) and (3) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement 
Procedure Rules) 19793 and at page 573 Paragraph A-B of the report where the case was reported4, the Supreme 
Court validated the incarceration of Evangelist Bayo Johnson without trial in the following wordings:  
“… Section 236(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law is not 
unconstitutional. Rather it clearly complements the 
provisions of section 32 of the 1979 Constitution and is 
designed to aid administration of criminal justice in the 
country…” 
Similarly, at Page 573 Paragraph B-C, the Supreme Court further held as follows: 
“… The court owes it a duty not to toy with an allegation 
as grave as treasonable felony. Neither should they play 
down the importance of individual liberty and freedom. 
Therefore what section 236(3) of the Criminal Procedure 
Law does is to maintain a balance between the two by 
                                                 
1
 Cap 30, Vol. 2, Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria 1994. 
2
 Cap 49 laws of former Bendel State of Nigeria 1976. 
3
 Now amended as the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure Rules) 2009. 
4
 (2007) 8 NWLR (PT 1037) P. 535. 
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doing away with the tendency of arbitrary indefinite police 
detention of suspect without order of court…” 
 
3. COMPLEMENTING OR CONFLICT? 
Section 236(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State which the Supreme Court of Nigeria validated as 
complementing section 32 of the 1979 Constitution and designed to aid the administration of criminal justice 
reads as follows: 
“If any person arrested for any indictable offence is 
brought before any magistrate for remand, such 
magistrate shall remand such person in custody or where 
applicable grant bail to him pending the arraignment of 
such person before the appropriate court or tribunal for 
trial”  
In the case of WUYEP VS WUYEP1, it was held that territorial jurisdiction of a trial court and the compositions 
of the courts are both aspects of jurisdiction for the validity of any proceedings before a court. The cases of 
GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE VS GAFAR,2 OKULATE VS AWOSANYA3 and MESSRS N.V. SHEEP 
VS THE MV’S ARAZ4 illustrates that courts are creatures of statutes and it is the statutes that creates a 
particular court that will also confer on it its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the court may be extended, not by the 
courts but by the legislature for it is part of its interpretative functions of the courts to expound the jurisdiction of 
the court but not to expand it. Hence, not even the Supreme Court can expand the jurisdiction of courts in 
Nigeria. 
Section 32(1) (c) of the 1979 Constitution and its equivalent provisions under the 1999 Constitution5 reads thus: 
32(1) Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no 
person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the 
following case and in accordance with a procedure 
permitted by law… 
(c)  “For the purpose of bringing him before a court in 
execution of the order of a court or upon reasonable 
suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence or to 
such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his 
committing a criminal offence”   
In both holding charges and remand proceedings, the charges and or First Information Report6 are often read to 
the hearing of the accused persons but plea and or response to the contents are not taken and hence the accused 
person or suspect is remanded to prison custody by the order of the magistrate who often than not has no 
requisite jurisdiction to try the offence/s as in Lufadeju Vs Johnsons case supra.  
The Supreme Court of Nigeria in Lufadeju Vs Johnson7 defined remand to mean: 
“…To send to prison or send back to prison from a court 
of law to be tried later after further inquires have been 
made; often is the phrase “remanded in custody”. It also 
means to re- commit on trail accused to custody after a 
preliminary examination” 
Any accused person has to be taken to court within a reasonable time8.  Reasonable time is defined to 
mean a person who is arrested is expected to be brought to court within a day of his arrest or detention if the 
place where he is arrested or detained has a court of competent jurisdiction within a radius of 40 kilometers. In 
other cases, he has to be brought to court within 2 days or any other time considered reasonable by the court9.  
From the above constitutional provisions, the position seems to be that in Nigeria, no person should be 
taken to court unless the charges against him or first information report is settled and the prosecuting authorities 
are prepared to go on with the trial against him. Under section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, a person shall be 
entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time. It is therefore argued that criminal cases when taken to court 
                                                 
1
 (1997) 10 NWLR (PT 523) 154. 
2
 (1997) 7 NWLR (PT 511) 51. 
3
 (2000) 1 SC 107. 
4
 (2000) 12 SC (PT 1) 164. 
5
 35(1) (c) of the 1999 Constitution. 
6
 First Information Report is the document used in arraigning suspects before the magistrate courts in the Northern part of 
Nigeria. 
7
 Supra at page 562 paragraphs F-G. 
8
 Section 35(4) of the 1999 Constitution. 
9
 Section 35(4) (a) & (b) of the 1999 Constitution. 
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should be ripe for hearing not for either further investigation and that suspects and or accused persons are not 
there on mere suspicion which cannot be regarded as reasonable suspicion as required under section 35(1) (c) of 
the 1999 Constitution.  
In the case of SULEIMAN VS C.O.P PLATEAU STATE1 the Supreme Court of Nigeria per Tobi JSC held thus: 
“The First Information Report as the name implies, is just 
a report that an offence is committed. It is no more than a 
charge in the Southern States. A charge is an allegation or 
accusation of crime. It is not tantamount to proof of 
evidence that the crime was committed or likely to have 
been committed”2 
There must therefore be something more than imagination or conjecture. It would therefore appear that 
the practice of preferring a holding charge against an accused person or a remand proceedings as in the case 
under consideration where the magistrate professed she had no jurisdiction to try treasonable felony pending the 
completion of investigation by the police or arraignment as the case may be has no place under section 35 (4) 
and 36 of the 1999 Constitution. These provisions of the Constitution postulates that law enforcement agents 
have obtained sufficient evidence that would support a prima facie case against an accused for the offence for 
which he stands charged. 
The remand proceedings in Lufadeju’s case amounts to taken cognizance of an offence for which the 
magistrate had no jurisdiction to try and thence any order made therein makes it to be unconstitutional. 
In the Supreme Court decision in OBIKOYA VS. REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES3 the court held thus: 
“… The existence or absent of jurisdiction in the court of 
trial goes to the root of the matter so as to sustain a nullity 
the trial judge’s decision in respect of the relevant subject 
matter…”4   
In the past, the accusation has been the unconstitutional detention by the police of suspects. Now by the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case under consideration, it appears that it has given credence to 
the effect that magistrate courts in Lagos can order remand of suspects in prison custody in respect of offences 
for which they have no jurisdiction to try until the police are ready and willing to arraign them before a court of 
competent jurisdiction. This is quite contrary to the various pronouncements of the courts that holding charges 
are unknown to the Nigeria law as illustrated in the cases of ANAEKWE VS C.O.P5 , JIMOH VS C.O.P6, 
OGORI VS KOLAWOLE7, ONAGORUWA VS STATE8, OSHINAYA VS C.O.P9 and CHIEF PAT ENWERE 
VS C.O.P10. Thence in the case SHAGARI VS C.O.P11  Sanusi JCA said; 
“Numerous pronouncements of our courts have stated that 
holding charge has no place in our judicial system. It is in 
fact unknown in Nigerian Law. Persons detained under an 
“illegal”, “unlawful” and “unconstitutional” document 
tagged “holding charge” must unhesitantly be released on 
bail. There is evidence that appellants were detained or 
remanded under a holding charge. The continued 
detention of the appellants by the lower court on a holding 
charge was not a judicious and judicial exercise of 
discretion…”12   
Ogbuagu JCA in the same case held as follows: 
“It is settled law that a “Holding Charge”, is unknown to 
Nigerian Law and any person or an accused person 
detained under, is entitled to be released on bail within a 
                                                 
1
 (2008) 21 W.R.N 1. 
2
 Ibid at p. 32 Lines 20 – 40. 
3
 (1975) 4 S.C at 34. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 (1996) 3 NWLR (PT 436) 320. 
6
 (2004) 17 NWLR (PT 902) 389. 
7
 (1985) 6 NCLR 534. 
8
 (1993) 7 NWLR (PT 303) 49. 
9
 (2004) 17 NWLR (PT 901) 1. 
10
 (1993) 6 NWLR (PT 299) 333. 
11
 (2005) 3Q.C.C.R, P. 17. 
12
 Ibid at P. 36. 
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reasonable time before trial (more so in non – capital 
offences)…”1 
The decision rather than complementing merely introduces jurisdictional conflicts and or confusion because a 
person brought on a holding charge or remand proceedings make the proceedings criminal proceedings. 
 
3. EXTENDING THE FRONTEIRS OF THE DECISION TO THE NORTHERN PART OF 
NIGERIA: A POSSIBILITY? 
As opposed to Lagos State of Nigeria where the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Act or Laws are 
applicable, in the Northern part of Nigeria, it is the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code that are the 
operational criminal statutes. The Supreme Court of Nigeria decision in Lufadeju’s case as highlighted earlier is 
now been viewed by some judges in the North to justify orders of remand in prison custody been made even in 
respect of offences for which they have no jurisdiction and for the police, a reason to arraign suspects before 
magistrate courts which does not have the requite jurisdiction. But can the decision be said to be applicable to 
the peculiar circumstances where the Penal Code Law and the Criminal Procedure Code Law are operational?  
To answer this question, it needs to be stated that the Criminal Procedure Code Law has no equivalent provision 
to section 236 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State that recognizes remand proceedings. 
Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Code law makes provision for a person not to be detained in custody for an 
unreasonable period i.e. more than 24 hours. The section provides thus: 
“No police officer shall detain in custody a person 
arrested without warrant for a longer period than in the 
circumstance of the case is reasonable and such period 
shall not, in the absence of an order of a court under 
section 129 exceed twenty four hours exclusive of the time 
necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the 
court and of any intervening public holiday”    
Section 129 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law reads thus: 
“whenever it appears that an investigation under section 
118 cannot be completed within twenty four hours of the 
arrest of the accused or suspected person at the police 
station, the police officer in charge of the police station 
shall release or discharge him under section 340, or send 
him as soon as practicable to the nearest court competent 
under chapter xv to take cognizance of the offence”   
Section 129(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code reads further: 
“The court may from time to time on the application of the 
officer in charge of a police station authorize the detention 
of the person under arrest in such custody as it think fit for 
a time not exceeding fifteen days and shall record its 
reasons for so doing” 
Under section 129(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law, if the police investigation is not completed within 15 
days and the court considers it advisable that the accused should be detained in custody pending further 
investigation, it shall remand the accused as required in Section 255 of the Criminal Procedure Code Law. Under 
Section 255(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law, the magistrate and indeed no court shall remand an accused 
person to custody for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time. 
Magistrate in the North are allowed to take cognizance of an offence2. Section 1 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code defines “take cognizance” to mean “take notice in an official capacity”. This however does not 
by any means mean trial or powers to carryout remand proceedings. The law envisages that the first 
informational report which is the document of arraignment of an accused must be brought before a court of 
competent jurisdiction otherwise it is to be returned to the appropriate court for adjudication. Hence, section 151 
(1) of the criminal procedure code reads” 
“If a first information report of a complaint in writing is 
received by a court which is not competent to take 
cognizance of the offence, the court shall return the first 
information report or complaint for presentation to the 
proper court with an endorsement to that effect” 
Section 151(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law further provides as follows: 
                                                 
1
 Ibid at P. 39. 
2
 Section 143(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law. 
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“If a complaint not in writing is made to a court which is 
not competent to take cognizance of the offence, the court 
shall direct the complaint to the proper court” 
The proper court here it is argued, is the court with the requisite jurisdiction. Thence, offences of 
treasonable felony or treason or culpable homicide are clearly outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court. 
This lack of jurisdiction means that it lacks the powers to make remand orders in respect of such offences. The 
only option left is as provided for under section 151(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law. The 1999 
Constitution and indeed the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for a Holding charge to be held against a 
person like the sword of Damocles.  
The practice under the Criminal Procedure Code Law is that the Police should take a person to court 
after being satisfied that on the facts at their disposal, a prima facie case can be established on the charge against 
such a person. The Police need to be vigilant so as to act very quickly to see that there is justice done early in 
respect of every information that reaches them and the Police after completing their investigations are not ready 
to arraign an accused to court they are expected to release him on bail pending the time he will be taken to a 
competent court of law for trial of the allegations against him1.  
Therefore the peculiar circumstances of the position of the North do not justify the blanket application of the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Lufadeju’s case. It therefore needs to be distinguished. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate Court in Lufadeju’s case (Supra) acted under section 236 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Law of 
Lagos State 1994 which gives powers to the magistrate courts to remand and even grant bail in capital offences 
pending proper arraignment before a competent court of law and that is in matters the magistrate in Lagos State 
has no jurisdiction to try in the first place and hence the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Nigeria holding that 
section 236(3) of the law complements the provisions of section 32 of the 1979 Constitution. Section 236(3) 
makes provision for remand in custody because the law of Lagos State says so. But the remand proceedings in 
Lagos State is akin to the holding charges in the North because a suspect cannot be taken to court without an 
information before the magistrate as it is in the information and or charge that the allegation leveled against an 
accused or suspect would be stated for the information of the court and upon which its orders would be based on. 
The decision parse under consideration is restrictive in nature as it only applies to Lagos State of Nigeria and has 
no extra territorial applicability in the North and thence limited in its nature and scope. While the said judgment 
still subsist, its however hoped that with time, there would be need for the Supreme Court of Nigeria to be urged 
to declare that decision to be per- incuriam in subsequent appeals before it because rather than enhancing the 
administration of justice, it has now degenerated to miss use and miss interpretation on the constitutional right to 
liberty of suspects as well as right to fair hearing that has even transcended on the jurisdiction of the magistrate 
courts as well as on the validity of statutes that goes contrary to the provisions of the 1999 Constitution. This can 
as well have the policy implication of withering away the long aged unconstitutionality of holding charges in 
Nigeria.   
 
 
                                                 
1
 Section 17 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance. 
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